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We show how to calculate the secure final key rate in the four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD
protocol with both source errors and statistical fluctuations with a certain failure probability. Our
results rely only on the range of only a few parameters in the source state. All imperfections in this
protocol have been taken into consideration without any unverifiable error patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide uncon-
ditional security based on the laws of quantum physics [1,
2]. But most existing experiment setups such as imper-
fect single-photon sources and finite-efficiency detectors
are not up to the standard of the theoretical models
assumed in the security proof and cause security prob-
lems [3–5]. Fortunately, the decoy-state method [6–
15] can help us assured the security with imperfect
single-photon sources [3, 4]. Theories including device-
independent QKD (DI-QKD) [16] and measurement-
device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [17, 18] have been
proposed to overcome the finite-efficiency detector prob-
lem.
MDI-QKD is based on the idea of entanglement swap-
ping [17, 18]. There, both Alice and Bob send out quan-
tum signals to the untrusted third party (UTP), but
neither of them performs any measurement. The UTP
would perform a Bell state measurement for each received
pulse pair and announce whether it was a successful event
as well as his measurement outcome in the public chan-
nel. Those bits corresponding to successful events will
be post selected and further processed for the final key.
By using the decoy-state method, Alice and Bob can use
imperfect single-photon sources [17, 19] securely in the
MDI-QKD. The decoy-state MDI-QKD has been studied
both experimentally [20–26] and theoretically [19, 27–39].
The existing decoy-state MDI-QKD theory assumes
perfect control of the source states. This is an impos-
sible task for any real setup in practice. Refs. [13, 15]
have show how to calculate the secure final key rate with
intensity fluctuation, or more generally, the source errors
in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) decoy-state QKD
protocol. In our last work [39], we get the formulas of se-
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cure final key rate with source errors in asymptotic case
in decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol without any presumed
conditions. (In most cases, we have no idea about the de-
tails of source errors, so we cannot make any assumptions
to the source error model.) But in real experiments, the
total pulse pairs sent out by Alice and Bob are finite and
we have to take the statistical fluctuation into consider-
ation. The ideas proposed in Refs. [36–38] such as global
optimization and combined constraints greatly enhance
the secure final key rate in nonasymptotic case in decoy-
state MDI-QKD protocol. In this paper, we will show
how to extend the formulas in Ref. [39] to nonasymp-
totic case with those brilliant ideas. In our method, we
have assumed the worst case that Eve knows exactly the
error of each pulse. Our result immediately applies to
all existing experimental results. Before going further,
we emphasize that our results here are unconditionally
correct because we have not assumed any unproven con-
ditions. Although there is another approach reported for
the issue of intensity error by using the model of attenu-
ation to pulses from an untrusted source, however, there
exists counter examples to the elementary equation in
that approach, as was shown in the appendix of Ref. [15].
This paper is arranged as follows. In Sec. II, we present
the protocol of our method. In Sec. III, we show the
details of how we extend the formulas in our last work
and get the secure final key rate in asymptotic case. In
Sec. IV, we show the relationship between the asymp-
totic values and nonasymptotic values with a fixed failure
probability ξ. And in Sec. V, we present the numerical
simulations. The article ends with some concluding re-
marks.
II. PROTOCOL
In this paper, we consider the four-intensity decoy-
state MDI-QKD protocol. In this protocol, Alice (Bob)
has three sources vA, xA, and yA (vB, xB , and yB) in X
basis and one source zA (zB) in Z basis, and they send
pulse pairs (one pulse from Alice, one pulse from Bob)
2to the UTP one by one. And if the UTP announces that
it’s a successful event, then we say that the ith pulse pair
has caused a count. Each pulse sent out by Alice (Bob)
is randomly chosen from one of the four sources lA (rB)
with constant probability plA (prB ) for l, r = v, x, y, z.
Sources vA and vB are the unstable vacuum sources in
X basis. Generally, these pulses from the unstable vac-
uum sources are not the exact zero photon-number state.
xA, yA (xB , yB) are the decoy sources which are used to
estimate the lower bound of yield and the upper bound
of phase-flip error rate of single-photon pulse pairs. zA
(zB) is the signal source which is used to extract the final
key.
We shall use notation lArB to indicate the two-pulse
source when Alice use source lA and Bob use source rB
to generate a pulse pair. For simplicity, we omit the
subscripts of any l and r for a two-pulse source, e.g.,
source xy is the source in which Alice uses source xA and
Bob uses source yB. We also denote the number of counts
and error counts caused by the two-pulse source lr as Nlr
and Mlr respectively. And we use 〈Nlr〉 and 〈Mlr〉 as
the asymptotic values of corresponding observed values
Nlr and Mlr. Nlr and Mlr are observables and will be
regarded as known values.
Suppose Alice and Bob send Nt pulse pairs to the UTP
in the whole protocol. In photon-number space, the state
of the ith pulse pair from source lA (rB) is
ρilA =
∑
k
al,ik |k〉〈k| (ρ
i
rB
=
∑
k
br,ik |k〉〈k|), (1)
for l, r = v, x, y, z.
We use superscripts U,L for the upper bound and lower
bound of a certain parameter. In particular, given any
k ≥ 0 in Eq. (1), we denote al,Uk , a
l,L
k (b
r,U
k , b
r,L
k ) for the
maximum value and minimum value of al,ik (b
r,i
k ) for any
i ∈ Nt, and l, r = v, x, y, z. We assume these bound
values are known in the protocol.
III. ANALYSIS FOR FINAL KEY RATE IN
ASYMPTOTIC CASE
In this section, we discuss how to get the secure final
key rate in asymptotic case. We denote the pulse pair
in which Alice send out a |j〉-photon pulse and Bob send
out a |k〉-photon pulse as |jk〉-photon pulse pair and we
denote the number of counts caused by |jk〉-pulse pairs
of source lr as nlrjk. Therefore we can formulate the total
pulse pair counts caused by source lr by
〈Nlr〉 =
∑
j,k≥0
nlrjk. (2)
We also need to introduce the following notation
〈N˜lr〉 =
∑
j,k≥1
nlrjk, 〈n
o
lr〉 =
∑
j≥1
nlrj0 +
∑
k≥1
nlr0k + n
lr
00.
(3)
It is easy to know 〈Nlr〉 = 〈N˜lr〉+ 〈n
o
lr〉.
As presented in Ref. [39], if
ay,Lk
ax,Uk
≥
ay,L2
ax,U2
≥
ay,L1
ax,U1
,
by,Lk
bx,Uk
≥
by,L2
bx,U2
≥
by,L1
bx,U1
, (4)
and
al,ik
av,ik
≥
al,i1
av,i1
,
br,ik
bv,ik
≥
br,i1
bv,i1
, (l, r = x, y), (5)
hold for all k ≥ 2, we could formulate the lower bound
counts of single-photon pulse pairs as follow:
nlr11 ≥ plpra
l,L
1 b
r,L
1 D11, (6)
where
D11 ≥
a
y,L
1
b
y,L
2
p2x
〈N˜xx〉 −
a
x,U
1
b
x,U
2
p2y
〈N˜yy〉
ax,U1 a
y,L
1 (b
x,U
1 b
y,L
2 − b
x,U
2 b
y,L
1 )
. (7)
Our next job is to formulate the upper bound of phase
flip error rate. If we denote the error counts caused by
|jk〉-photon pulse pair of source xx as mxxjk , we have
〈Mxx〉 =
∑
j,k≥0
mxxjk = 〈M˜xx〉+ 〈m
o
xx〉
≥〈moxx〉+m
xx
11 , (8)
where
〈M˜xx〉 =
∑
j,k≥1
mxxjk , (9)
〈moxx〉 =
∑
j≥1
mxxj0 +
∑
k≥1
mxx0k +m
xx
00 . (10)
Thus we have
eph11 =
mxx11
nxx11
≤
〈Mxx〉 − 〈m
o
xx〉
Ntp2xa
x,L
1 b
x,L
1 s
L
11
, (11)
where eph11 is the phase flip error rate of signal source
zz and sL11 = D
L
11/Nt is the lower bound of the yield of
single-photon pulse pairs.
The most important conclusion we get in Ref. [39] is
that we could formulate the lower and upper bounds of
〈N˜xx〉, 〈M˜xx〉, and 〈N˜yy〉 without perfect vacuum source.
Actually, we only need the upper bounds of 〈M˜xx〉 and
〈N˜yy〉 in this paper. Explicitly, we have
〈M˜Uxx〉 =
1
1− σxA − σ
x
B
(
〈Mxx〉 −
pxa
x,L
0
pva
v,U
0
〈Mvx〉
−
pxb
x,L
0
pvb
v,U
0
〈Mxv〉 −
p2xa
x,U
0 b
x,U
0
p2va
v,L
0 b
v,L
0
〈Mvv〉
)
, (12)
〈N˜Uyy〉 =
1
1− σyA − σ
y
B
(
〈Nyy〉 −
pya
y,L
0
pva
v,U
0
〈Nvy〉
−
pyb
y,L
0
pvb
v,U
0
〈Nyv〉 −
p2ya
y,U
0 b
y,U
0
p2va
v,L
0 b
v,L
0
〈Nvv〉
)
, (13)
3where
σxA =
ax,U0 a
v,U
1
av,L0 a
x,L
1
, σxB =
bx,U0 b
v,U
1
bv,L0 b
x,L
1
,
σyA =
ay,U0 a
v,U
1
av,L0 a
y,L
1
, σyB =
by,U0 b
v,U
1
bv,L0 b
y,L
1
.
(14)
Given the obvious fact that the bit flip error rate must
be 50% if the bit is caused by a |j0〉-photon or |0k〉-
photon pulse pair, we have
〈noxx〉 = 2〈m
o
xx〉, (15)
and we define H =
2〈moxx〉
p2xNt
to simplify the following cal-
culation. With Eqs. (8) and (12), it is a pretty easy work
to get the lower and upper bounds of H, which is
2(〈Mxx〉 − 〈M˜
U
xx〉)
p2xNt
≤ H ≤
2〈Mxx〉
p2xNt
. (16)
To formulate the secure final key rate with the ob-
served counting rates, we need to introduce the following
notation
〈Slr〉 =
〈Nlr〉
plprNt
, Slr =
Nlr
plprNt
,
〈Tlr〉 =
〈Mlr〉
plprNt
, Tlr =
Mlr
plprNt
,
(17)
where Slr and Tlr are the observed values of the counting
rate and error counting rate of source lr, and 〈Slr〉 and
〈Tlr〉 are their corresponding asymptotic values. Then we
could formulate the final key rate with those asymptotic
counting rate values. With Eqs. (12) and (16), we could
get the lower and upper bounds values of H
HU =2〈Txx〉, (18)
HL =
2
1− σxA − σ
x
B
[
ax,L0
av,U0
〈Tvx〉+
bx,L0
bv,U0
〈Txv〉
−
ax,U0 b
x,U
0
av,L0 b
v,L
0
〈Tvv〉 − (σ
x
A + σ
x
B)〈Txx〉
]
, (19)
Given a certain H (H ∈ [HL,HU ]), the lower bound of
the yield of single-photon pulse pairs is
sL11(H) =
S+ − S− − ay,L1 b
y,L
2 H
ax,U1 a
y,L
1 (b
x,U
1 b
y,L
2 − b
x,U
2 b
y,L
1 )
, (20)
where
S+ =ay,L1 b
y,L
2 〈Sxx〉+
ax,U1 b
x,U
2 (
a
y,L
0
a
v,U
0
〈Svy〉+
b
y,L
0
b
v,U
0
〈Syv〉)
1− σyA − σ
y
B
,
(21)
S− =
ax,U1 b
x,U
2 (〈Syy〉+
a
y,U
0
b
y,U
0
a
v,L
0
b
v,L
0
〈Svv〉)
1− σyA − σ
y
B
, (22)
and the upper bound of phase flip error rate is
eph,U11 (H) =
〈Txx〉 −
1
2H
ax,L1 b
x,L
1 s
L
11(H)
, (23)
and thus the final key rate is
R(H) =p2z{a
z,L
1 b
z,L
1 s
L
11(H)[1−H(e
ph,U
11 (H))]
− fSzzH(Ezz)}, (24)
where f is the error correction inefficiency and H(x) =
−xlog2x−(1−x)log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon entropy
function. And R(H) is the final key rate of one emissive
pulse pair with a certain H. Here we have used the fact
that the lower bound of the yield of single-photon pulse
pairs in the Z basis can be estimated by its lower bound
in the X basis. The secure final key rate is
R = min[R(H)], H ∈ [HL,HU ]. (25)
IV. ANALYSIS FOR STATISTICAL
FLUCTUATION
The formulas of secure final key rate in Sec. III are
denoted by expected values, but the direct values we get
in experiments are observed values. The relationship be-
tween expected values and observed values is discussed
as follows. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be n random samples, de-
tected with the value 1 or 0, and let X denote their sum
satisfying X =
∑n
i=1Xi. µ is the expected value of X .
From the Chernoff bound [25, 31, 40] with a fixed failure
probability ξ which is required in experiments, we have
µL(X) =
X
1 + δ1(X)
, (26)
µU (X) =
X
1− δ2(X)
, (27)
where we can obtain the value of δ1(X) and δ2(X) by
solving the following equations
(
eδ1
(1 + δ1)(1+δ1)
) X
1+δ1
=
ξ
2
, (28)(
e−δ2
(1 − δ2)(1−δ2)
) X
1−δ2
=
ξ
2
. (29)
4With Eqs. (26) and (27), we could get the following useful
constraints
µL(LlrSlr) ≤ Llr〈Slr〉 ≤ µ
U (LlrSlr), (30)
Lxx〈Txx〉 ≤ µ
U (LxxTxx), (31)
Lxx〈Sxx〉+ Lvy〈Svy〉 ≥ µ
L(LxxSxx + LvySvy),
Lxx〈Sxx〉+ Lyv〈Syv〉 ≥ µ
L(LxxSxx + LyvSyv),
Lvy〈Svy〉+ Lyv〈Syv〉 ≥ µ
L(LvySvy + LyvSyv),
Lxx〈Sxx〉+ Lvy〈Svy〉+ Lyv〈Syv〉 ≥
µL(LxxSxx + LvySvy + LyvSyv),
(32)
Lyy〈Syy〉+ Lvv〈Svv〉 ≤ µ
U (LyySyy + LvvSvv), (33){
Lvx〈Tvx〉+ Lxv〈Txv〉 ≥ µ
L(LvxTvx + LxvTxv),
Lxx〈Txx〉+ Lvv〈Tvv〉 ≤ µ
U (LxxTxx + LvvTvv),
(34)
where Llr = plprNt is the total pulse pairs sent out by
source lr.
With those preparations, we can now calculate the se-
cure final key rate. We first calculate the lower bound
of S+ with Eqs. (21), (30), and (32) and the upper
bound of S− with Eqs. (22), (30), and (33). And then
we calculate the upper and lower bounds of H with
Eqs. (18), (19), (30), (31), and (34). For each certain H
(H ∈ [HL,HU ]), we could get one corresponding R(H)
with Eqs. (20), (23), and (24). Finally, we get the secure
final key rate R = min[R(H)].
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we present some numerical simulations
to show the efforts of intensity fluctuations. Firstly, we
shall estimate what values would be probably observed
for the yields and error yields in the normal cases by the
linear models [35].We focus on the symmetric case where
the two channel transmissions from Alice to UTP and
from Bob to UTP are equal. We also assume that the
UTP’s detectors are identical, i.e., they have the same
dark count rates and detection efficiencies, and their de-
tection efficiencies do not depend on the incoming sig-
nals. As discussed before, we know that the methods
presented in this paper apply to any sources that satisfy
the condition given by Eqs. (4) and (5). For simplicity,
we suppose that Alice and Bob use weak coherent states
(WCS). The density matrix of the WCS with intensity µ
can be written into ρ =
∑∞
k=0
e−µµk
k! |k〉〈k|. The actual
intensity of the ith pulse for source l out of Alice’s (or
Bob’s) laboratory is
µil = µl(1 + δ
i
l ), (l = x, y, z), (35)
and µiv ≤ δ1 with the boundary conditions |δ
i
l | ≤ δ2 for
l = x, y, z.
The values of parameters used in the numerical simula-
tions are listed in Table I. Figures 1 and 2 show the key
e0 ed pd ηd f αf ξ
0.5 1.5% 6.02× 10−6 14.5% 1.16 0.2 1.0× 10−7
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numerical
simulations. Here e0 is error rate of the vacuum count, ed is
the misalignment-error probability, pd is the dark count rate
of the UTP’s detectors, ηd is the detection efficiency of the
UTP’s detectors, f is the error correction inefficiency, αf is
the fiber loss coefficient (dB/km), and ξ is the fixed failure
probability.
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FIG. 1: (color online) The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus
transmission distance (the distance between Alice and Bob)
with different intensity fluctuations under the experimental
parameters listed in Table I. Here we set the total number of
pulses at each side Nt = 10
11.
rates versus transmission distance with different inten-
sity fluctuations. We set the total pulse pairs Nt = 10
11
in Figure 1 and Nt = 10
13 and the detection efficiency
ηd = 40.0% in Figure 2. Figures 1 and 2 show that the
effect of the intensity fluctuation is worse with worse ex-
perimental conditions (including smaller data size and
worse detectors).
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have shown how to calculate the se-
cure final key rate in the decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol
with both source errors and statistical fluctuations with
a certain failure probability, provided that the parame-
ters in the diagonal state of the source satisfy Eqs. (4)
and (5) and bound values of each parameter in the state
are known. By our method, all imperfections in a finite
pulse pair size decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol with an
unstable source have been taken into consideration. Our
50 50 100 150 200
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FIG. 2: (color online) The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus
transmission distance (the distance between Alice and Bob)
with different intensity fluctuations under the experimental
parameters listed in Table I. Here we set the total number
of pulses at each side Nt = 10
13 and the detection efficiency
ηd = 40.0%.
result can immediately apply to all existing experimental
results.
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